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Executive Summary 
 
 
Policy-makers in almost all countries agree on one thing: namely on the importance of 
education and skills to ensuring future economic prosperity. A fruitful line of research has 
focused on determining the impact that acquiring education or training has on an individual’s 
labour market productivity and earning prospects: this is known as rate of return analysis. The 
CEE has undertaken extensive research in this area and provided evidence on the returns to a 
variety of qualifications in the UK (CEE Discussion Papers 4, 6, 35 and 47). The CEE has 
also investigated specific issues such as the return to basic skills (CEE DP 3), returns to the 
marginal learner (CEE DP 45), returns to NVQ2 (CEE DP 46), the returns to qualifications 
acquired in adulthood (CEE DPs 19 and 39) and the returns to training (CEE DP 36). In 
addition the CEE has researched the range of methodological issues pertaining to rate of 
return analysis (see CEE DP 5 and 16). 
 
In this paper we summarise current understanding on the returns to qualifications, focusing 
specifically on differences in the economic values of qualifications by sector. First we explain 
what we mean by rate of return analysis in section 2. In section 3 we then discuss how rates of 
return estimates might be useful for policy-makers, and in particular how those who are trying 
to understand and meet the skill needs of different sectors of the economy might use such 
information. In section 4 we describe how rates of return are actually calculated in practice, 
before going on to summarise the evidence base. We start with a discussion of aggregate 
supply and demand in section 5, before focusing on the rate of return to specific qualifications 
and types of education in section 6. We conclude with an analysis of what the empirical 
evidence implies for policy-makers working on sector skills issues (section 7).  
 
A complex picture emerges from the evidence base.  
 
• In the UK there has been a massive expansion in the supply of qualified labour. This 
expansion has not lead to a fall in the average return to a year of schooling in the UK, 
suggesting that the demand for qualifications in the UK is still sufficiently high to 
justify further expansion.  
 
• Qualifications that are supposedly tailored to employers’ skill needs, such as NVQs, 
are actually valued less highly in the labour market. On the ground, it is the traditional 
vocational qualifications and academic qualifications that have the greater economic 
value. 
 
• Newer vocational qualifications (particularly NVQ2) yield a zero or minimal return in 
the labour market, although they do increase an individual’s likelihood of being in 
employment. 
 
• The return to lower level vocational qualifications varies substantially across sectors. 
More research is needed on the ground to understand why NVQs have been successful 
in some sectors and less so in others.  
 
• NVQ qualifications yield a respectably high return if they are acquired through a 
modern apprenticeship.  
 
• Rapid expansion of the supply of graduates has resulted in much more variation in 
graduate outcomes. Although the overall return to a degree has not declined, it does 
appear that some types of more recent graduates are seeing a small decline in the 
return to their degree.  
 
• Much of the apparent fall in the return to a degree for very new graduates is 
concentrated specifically on graduates who fail to get graduate level jobs.  
 
• There is substantial variation in returns across different degree subjects, and by 
implication across different sectors of the economy.  
 
• In particular, the return to arts and humanities degrees for very recent graduates 
appears to have fallen to zero.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
Policy-makers in almost all countries agree on one thing: namely on the importance of 
education and skills to ensuring future economic prosperity. Certainly we know that countries 
with higher levels of education and skill, on average have higher levels of productivity and 
economic growth (Machin and Vignoles, 2005). However, proving that there is a causal 
relationship between education and skill, and economic growth, at a country level has proved 
quite problematic, not least because countries vary in so many dimensions, not just their 
levels of education and skill (Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2000). Yet despite the difficulties in 
this research area, policy-makers still need to quantify the impact of education and skill if 
they are to justify continued investment in education and skill development. A more fruitful 
line of research has focused on determining the impact that acquiring education or training 
has on an individual’s labour market productivity and earning prospects: this is known as rate 
of return analysis. This type of analysis tends to, by necessity, focus largely on qualifications, 
rather than skill acquisition per se.  
 
Nonetheless rate of return analyses can still be useful in informing sector skill issues, as we 
shall show in this paper. First we explain what we mean by rate of return analysis in section 
2. In section 3 we then discuss how rates of return estimates might be useful for policy-
makers, and in particular how those who are trying to understand and meet the skill needs of 
different sectors of the economy might use such information. In section 4 we describe how 
rates of return are actually calculated in practice, before going on to summarise the evidence 
base. We start with a discussion of aggregate supply and demand in section 5, before 
focusing on the rate of return to specific qualifications and types of education in section 6. 
We conclude with an analysis of what the empirical evidence implies for policy-makers 
working on sector skills issues (section 7).  
 
 
2. Some Theory 
 
In rate of return analyses, education is analysed as an investment, which involves individuals 
and the state incurring costs now (lost income or direct costs of tuition), in order to reap gains 
in the future (higher income). So how does education and training actually enhance 
individuals’ earnings? Human capital theory suggests that when individuals invest in 
education and training they make themselves more productive in the labour market, and this 
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then leads them to have higher earnings. This assumes that the labour market is fully 
competitive so that wages will fully reflect the productivity of workers, and that any gain in 
productivity due to education will subsequently result in higher earnings for the worker. Of 
course one can question these assumptions. Signalling theory (Spence, 1973) for example, 
hypothesizes that individuals acquire education merely to signal their already superior 
productivity to potential employers, and that the education itself is not necessarily 
productivity enhancing. Equally there are a number of theoretical reasons as to why wages 
may not reflect an individual’s true productivity2. However, the bulk of the empirical 
evidence on this issue is broadly supportive of a human capital perspective (Machin and 
Vignoles, 2005).  
 
Based on the human capital theory framework, one can use rate of return analyses to evaluate 
the economic value of education and training, and this information can be used to guide 
policy makers on two crucially important questions, namely: 
  
1) How much education or training and what types of education or training should 
individuals invest in? 
2) How much education or training and what types of education or training should 
society invest in? 
 
Of course if individuals reap the benefits of investment in education and training, in the form 
of higher earnings, one might ask why the state is involved in the process at all. There are a 
number of market failures that potentially justify state involvement. Firstly, if education or 
training has knock on effects to other people and organisations in society, i.e. if there are 
externalities, then leaving investment decisions purely to individuals will tend to lead to 
underinvestment. This is because individuals only take into account their personal gain from 
the investments they are making. Thus if a graduate not only becomes more productive as a 
result of her degree, but also causes others in her team to work more productively, then there 
is a positive externality from her education that she will ignore when deciding whether to 
take a degree or not. In this instance, the state should intervene to encourage her to invest (by 
subsidising the education or giving a grant), so that our level of investment in education is 
optimal from the perspective of society as a whole. A second important market failure is that 
individuals may lack the resources to make education or training investments and may be 
                                                 
2 For example, this might be the case in the public sector where there is no profit motive and wages are less 
likely to reflect true productivity. 
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unable to borrow what they need, i.e. they are credit constrained. Thus poorer families may 
be unable to send their children to school because of they cannot meet the costs of schooling. 
This is certainly the case in many developing countries. A number of other market failures 
may exist, including information failure. Individuals may not help their children invest in 
education to the optimal level because they do not know of the full economic value of 
education. By and large these arguments for some state intervention in education have long 
been accepted by most societies, as is evident from the fact that primary and secondary 
education is state funded in all developed countries. 
 
Equally however, it should be recognized that where governments do intervene in the market 
for education and training, they often fail to provide the socially optimal amount of 
education/training. This can be because governments invest on the basis of voters’ 
preferences, which may encourage disproportionate investment in some types of education 
(higher education) and less investment in others (special needs education). Another important 
reason why state investments may be inefficient is simply that policy-makers do not know 
where they should be investing. It is therefore essential that policy-makers have access to 
methodologically robust and accurate rate of return analyses to inform them of where they 
may expect the highest social or private rate of return to education and training. Only if 
policy-makers act on the basis of accurate information about the economic value of different 
forms of education and training investment is it likely to be the case that state intervention 
actually overcomes the market failures we described above.  
 
 
3. Using Rates of Return in Policy-Making 
 
So what can rates of return actually tell us? Information on private rates of return3 can inform 
individuals as to which type of education or training investment will yield them the highest 
return, i.e. the highest future gain in wages. Or more specifically, private rates of return can 
inform individuals as to the average rate of return experienced by individuals who have made 
that kind of investment in the past.  
 
Social rates of return can inform policy-makers of what they might expect to get back from 
investments made by the state, i.e. higher income levels and by implication higher 
                                                 
3 Private rates of return take into account private direct and indirect costs of investment and the private benefit, 
i.e. the net earnings gain accruing to the individual as a result of his or her educational investment. 
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productivity. Social rates of return take into account the social gain from the investment, 
generally measured as higher pre-tax earnings although sometimes including financial 
estimates of other wider benefits such as lower crime and better health. On the cost side, 
social rates of return take into account any investments made by the state in the education or 
training, such as subsidies.  
 
One can then identify where private rates of return are very high relative to social rates of 
return, which would suggest that some of the burden of the costs of the investment could be 
shifted from the state to the individual thereby reducing the gap between the private and 
social rate of return. An example of where rates of return have been used in this way is in 
higher education. The private rate of return to higher education in the UK is extremely high, 
as we shall see below, and by most accounts much higher than the social rate of return. This 
implies that individuals would still invest in their own higher education, even if the state did 
not subsidise it as much as it does. This argument was indeed used in the late 1990s to shift 
some of the burden of the costs of HE on to individuals via the introduction of tuition fees. 
 
Equally high social rates of return can be used to justify additional resources being allocated 
to education and training at the expense of other types of investment, for example 
investments in transport. An example of where social rates of return to education is used in 
this manner is in the government’s Comprehensive Spending Review, during which each 
government department puts forward its estimates of the rate of return on its various proposed 
investments. In the case of the Department for Education and Skills, rate of return analyses 
have been used to justify a range of educational investments, including support for improving 
basic skills and the Government’s “Skills for Life Strategy”. 
 
Some caution is required however. As will be evident from the next section, estimates of the 
rate of return to a particular type of investment tend to be based on retrospective data. In 
other words, one estimates the rate of return to education by looking at the current labour 
market earnings of individuals who acquired different levels of education in the past. 
However, this will not necessarily predict the future labour market value of education 
acquired today. Thus rates of return are inherently backward looking and one needs to take 
care not to use them too prescriptively. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s there was much 
discussion of the need for more language graduates to meet the challenge of globalisation. 
Rates of return analyses at that time suggested a relatively high return to language degrees 
and policy-makers attempted to boost the number of individuals taking that subject. Some 
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years later the rate of return to a language degree is on the low side (particularly for women)4, 
and concern has shifted to shortages in other subject areas. In some sense this is what one 
would like to see happen. As the supply of language graduates expands so the return to that 
degree should fall somewhat. The point is however, that while rate of return analyses can be 
used effectively to signal trends in the supply and demand for different types of skill, more 
detailed manpower planning on the basis of specific rate of return estimates is fraught with 
difficulties. 
 
Another limitation is that rate of return analyses generally focus on the rate of return to 
specific qualifications or training investments. Yet what determines individuals’ actual level 
of productivity is the level and appropriateness of their skills. Skills are acquired in a number 
of different ways, of which arguably the most important is on the job experience and training. 
Much of this form of skill acquisition is ignored in the rate of return literature. 
 
With those caveats in mind, what can rate of return analyses tell us about sector skills needs 
specifically? Those seeking to understand and meet the skill needs of particular sectors need 
more information. They need to understand what is happening to the supply of different 
qualifications and skills in their sector, as well as the demand for different types of skill by 
employers in that sector. Rate of return analyses can help on two levels. Firstly, they add to 
our understanding of what is going on in the market for skills nationally, and in doing so 
highlight trends that may cause problems in a particular sector. For example, very high 
returns to a particular degree subject suggests either high demand or low supply or both, 
which may be very pertinent information for sectors that make high use of graduates from 
that discipline.  
 
Equally rate of return analyses that are conducted on a sector-by-sector basis can inform 
policy-makers of labour market conditions within a particular sector. One might of course ask 
why the value of a particular qualification varies from sector to sector. Surely if the market is 
working properly individuals who have a NVQ3 and work in car manufacturing, for example, 
will simply start working in another sector if they see that workers with NVQ3 qualifications 
are higher paid there. However, the reality is that apparently similar qualifications still differ 
enormously in terms of content and applicability to the job, and therefore can vary in terms of 
labour market value across different sectors. This is especially the case with many vocational 
qualifications. Thus estimating rates of return to different qualifications by sector can not 
                                                 
4 See Table 1 in the Appendix. 
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only inform policy-makers as to relative supply and demand conditions in that sector but can 
also potentially inform policy-makers of the effectiveness of different types of qualifications 
across different sectors. In other words it can tell us the extent to which a particular 
qualification, such as an NVQ2 in hairdressing, is genuinely valued by and valuable to 
employers, as compared to an NVQ2 in construction for example. 
 
 
4. Measuring the Return to Education 
 
Although we will not spend long on the technical details of how rates of return are actually 
calculated, a brief explanation will aid the reader in interpreting the evidence base. 
Regression analysis is most commonly used to estimate or approximate the return to 
education. Information is generally collected on a cross section of individuals working in the 
labour market5, including data on their earnings, education and training, work experience or 
age and other personal characteristics, such as gender. A statistical model of wages is then 
estimated which relates individuals’ current wages to their education and training, as well as 
their other characteristics. This is shown below, where  
 
iW indicates individuals’ earnings 
 
     represents each individual’s years of schooling or training i
S
 
'X represents individuals’ personal characteristics, such as gender 
 
 ,log '10 iiii XSwW εγββ +++==
 
The equation therefore indicates that an individual’s wages6 are determined by their 
schooling and personal characteristics. The impact of an additional year of schooling on 
wages is given by the coefficient 1β . Thus if the coefficient 1β takes a value of 0.1, this 
implies that a person with an additional year of schooling (or increment of training) has 
earnings that are around 10% higher than their counterpart that is similar in all other respects 
but who does not have the additional year of schooling. Another way of estimating this 
                                                 
5 Although longitudinal data has been used to estimate robust estimates of the rate of return to education. See for 
example Dearden et al. 2002. 
6 The Mincerian wage function is expressed in terms of the logarithm of wages.  
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equation is not to include years of schooling but to use indicators of whether the person has 
got a particular type of qualification, such as O levels or an NVQ3. The principle however is 
the same. The coefficients on these indicator variables will then indicate the approximate 
wage premium associated with that particular qualification, as compared to individuals who 
have no qualifications at all. 
 
Most of the UK literature on rates of return analyses uses this methodology, which provides 
an estimate of the private return or wage premium associated with a year of schooling or a 
particular type of qualification. This approach does take into account the indirect costs of 
education, i.e. the lost income due to taking initial schooling. However, to properly calculate 
the rate of return to education one must also take account of the direct costs of the 
educational investment, such as tuition fees. Most of the estimates of presented in this paper 
focus only on the wage gain from education and training, including opportunity costs of 
investment but not direct costs. We also said that theory suggests we should be interested in 
two types of returns. Firstly, private returns that accrue to the individual, and secondly social 
returns that accrue to the state. In practice, most of the UK estimates are private returns or at 
best gross returns (which indicate the pre-tax income gain due to education rather than net 
income gain). There are far fewer robust estimates of the true social rate of return to 
education and training, and even fewer quantified estimates of the wider benefits of education 
and training, such as better health and lower crime (noteable exceptions are papers by 
Feinstein, 2002). Despite these limitations however, the evidence base on the private returns 
to education and training is still potentially very important in helping policy-makers 
determine the right skill strategies, as will become apparent below. 
 
Before we review the empirical evidence, it is worth noting the major methodological 
problem in this area of work, namely that it is difficult to separate out the impact of education 
on individuals’ wages from the impact of individuals’ inherent ability. Thus if more able and 
productive individuals tend to acquire more education, it is hard to determine whether their 
higher wages (and by implication their productivity) are really down to the education itself. 
The most robust evidence in this field has tackled this issue in a number of different ways 
(Harmon and Oosterbeek 2000) and has at least partially overcome this particular problem. 
One simple way that has been used by a number of UK researchers (Dearden et al. 2002) is to 
include measures of ability in the model described above. In other words, one can attempt to 
separate the impacts of education and inherent ability by including test scores from early 
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childhood in the model, alongside variables measuring an individual’s education. Other 
econometric methods have also been used, including the method of instrumental variables. 
We do not discuss the methodologies in detail but merely note that it is an issue to be aware 
of, and one that we will need to return to when we discuss the evidence base on the value of 
vocational qualifications specifically. 
 
 
5. What is Happening to Aggregate Supply and Demand? 
 
Even before we start discussing the economic value of specific qualifications, there is a more 
fundamental policy question: what has the large expansion in the supply of qualifications 
over recent decades done to the UK labour market? Economic theory suggests that a large 
expansion in the supply of qualified workers should have lowered the price for skilled labour, 
all other things equal. In other words, a large increase in the number of qualified workers 
should reduce the rate of return to qualifications. However, we also know that technology is 
causing firms to upgrade their skill requirements (Machin and Van Reenen, 1997), and it is 
conceivable that the supply of more qualified labour has expanded and yet still not kept 
supply with an even larger increase in demand. In this instance, we would expect a rise in the 
‘price’ of skilled labour, in other words a rise in the rate of return to qualifications. 
 
So what has happened in practice? Certainly we have expanded the supply of qualifications. 
This is illustrated below with data from the recent update to the UK skills audit. The supply 
of younger workers with qualifications at level 3 or above has risen dramatically in recent 
years, albeit to levels that are still below that of many of our international competitors.  
 
Figure 2 below also indicates that Great Britain and Northern Ireland have very high returns 
to schooling7. For example, the rate of return to a year of schooling in Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland is second only to the rate of return in the Philippines. Workers with one 
more year of schooling in Great Britain earn around 13% more in terms of wages. This 
compares to West  
 
 
                                                 
7 See also Table 2 in the Appendix. 
 8
Figure 1 The Supply of 25-28 Years Old at Level 3 or Above 
 
,log '10 iiii XSwW εγββ +++==
 
Source: Steedman et al. 2004 http://www.dfes.gov.uk/research/data/uploadfiles/RR548.pdf  
 
 
Germany, for example, where the additional year of schooling is worth only 4%. Other 
studies confirm that, using the most robust methodologies and allowing for the ability bias 
problem8 we described earlier, the return to education in the UK is between 10-15% for an 
additional year of schooling9. This implies a relatively high demand and/or low supply of 
more educated workers. Given that we know the supply of more qualified labour has 
increased so much, it seems likely that the real factor driving the high return to schooling in 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland is in fact very high demand. 
 
The figure below considers the average return to a year of schooling during the period 1985-
1995, the period during which there was a significant expansion in the supply of skilled 
labour. Of course what policy-makers would like to know is whether the rate of return is 
falling during this period and beyond. Trostel et al. (2002) suggest that rates of return over 
time have been relatively stable for both Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Other evidence 
supports this (Dearden et al. 2002; Dearden et al. 2004a; Dickerson, 200510).  In aggregate 
                                                 
8 That more able individuals get more education and it is hard to distinguish the effect of education from the 
effect of inherent ability. 
9 See Table 4 in the Appendix. 
10Dearden, L., McIntosh, S., Myck, M. and Vignoles, A. (2002) ‘The Returns to Academic, Vocational and 
Basic Skills in Britain’, Bulletin of Economic Research, vol 54, no. 3, pp. 249-274. 
Dearden, L; McGranahan, L; Sianesi, B. (2004a). “Returns to Education for the ‘Marginal Learner’: Evidence 
from the BCS70”, Centre for Economics of Education Discussion Paper No. 45. 
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therefore, there appears to be no major oversupply problem yet. However, as we discuss later 
in this paper, this does not mean that the return to education is stable for all types of 
education investment and for all types of individuals. 
 
Figure 2 International Comparisons of the Returns to Schooling (1985-1995) 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
US
A
Gr
ea
t B
rita
in
We
st 
Ge
rm
an
y
Ru
ss
ia
No
rw
ay
Au
str
ali
a
Ne
the
rla
nd
s
Au
str
ia
Po
lan
d 
Ea
st 
Ge
rm
an
y
Ne
w 
Ze
ala
nd Ita
ly
Ire
lan
d
Ja
pa
n
Hu
ng
ary
N.
 Ire
lan
d
Sw
ed
en
Slo
ve
nia
Isr
ae
l
Cz
ec
h R
ep
.
Bu
lga
ria
So
lva
k R
ep
.
Ca
na
da
Cz
ec
ho
slo
va
kia
Sp
ain
Sw
itz
erl
an
d
La
tvi
a
Ph
ilip
pin
es
R
et
ur
n 
to
 S
ch
oo
lin
g 
(%
)
Men Women
 
 
Source: Trostel et al (2002)11. 
 
 
6. The Evidence Base: Returns to Education and Training in the UK 
 
The previous section suggested that the return to a year of education in the UK is between 10 
and 15%. However, for policy-makers this is not particularly useful information. There are 
many different forms of education and training investments, and we need to understand the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Dickerson, E.P. (2005) A Study on Rates of Return to Investment in Level 3 and Higher Qualifications, 
Warwick Institute for Employment Reserch. 
 
11Trostel, P.; Walker, I.; Woolley, P. (2002). “Estimates of the Economic Return to Schooling for 28 Countries”, 
Labour Economics, 9, 1-16.  
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relative economic value of each of these. In this section we summarise the evidence base on 
rates of return to different qualifications and types of education, starting with the return to 
staying on in school. 
 
Figure 3 Staying On at School and Exam Achievement 
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Exam Achievement 
Staying On at 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Clark, Conlon and Galindo-Rueda (2005) 
Notes: Staying on is defined as the percentage of pupils staying on after the compulsory school leaving age. The 
exam achievement series measures the percentage of school-leavers achieving five or more higher grade GCSE 
(or O level) passes. Data for 1994-2000 comes from DfES Statistical Bulletins. Before 1994, data are taken back 
using a series very kindly provided by Duncan McVicar (see McVicar and Rice, 2001, for details). 
 
 
Returns to staying on past compulsory schooling 
The UK has historically had a major problem with a long tail of under achievers. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3 below which shows the exam success rate at age 16, i.e. the proportion 
of  
the cohort achieving the equivalent of 5 or more grades A*-C at GCSE. The proportion 
succeeding in their examinations at age 16 remained stagnant from around 1970 to the mid 
1980s. Thus in the 1980s not only were around half the cohort leaving full time education 
altogether after the age of 16 but they were leaving with no qualifications. More than two 
thirds of the cohort did not achieve examination success at age 16 and therefore entered on 
the labour market with minimal academic qualifications at all. 
 
Given these policy concerns, it is important to consider the economic value of persuading 
more young people to stay on in school past the compulsory school leaving age. Evidence 
from Dearden et al. (2004a) suggests that boys who stay on in school for an additional year at 
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age 16 earn around 11-12% more than boys who drop out at that age. For women the return 
to staying on is much higher, around 18%. This suggests that there is a sizeable economic 
return to enabling more young people to stay on in school for longer and raises the question 
as to why more young people do not stay on, given that they could expect to get such a high 
return from doing so. One possibility is that students are credit constrained. This possibility 
motivated policies such as the Education Maintenance Allowances scheme, which provides a 
cash subsidy to poor students to encourage them to stay on in school past the compulsory 
school age of 16. 
 
The return to UK qualifications 
Most of those who stay on past the age of 16 end up getting a qualification of some kind, 
whether academic or vocational. Understanding the relative economic value of these different 
qualifications is also important. Table 1 below gives a summary of the return to a number of 
different academic and vocational qualifications in the UK. 
 
The figures in Table 1 represent additive wage premiums. To calculate the return to the usual 
route to a degree one must sum returns to O levels, A levels, and a Degree. This table neatly 
illustrates a number of important findings in the literature. Firstly, the returns to many UK 
qualifications, particularly higher level ones, are high. For example, males with a degree earn 
up to 67% more than an unqualified worker. Secondly, the returns to academic qualifications  
 
Table 1  Summary of Returns to Specific Qualifications 
 
Qualification Men Women 
   
O levels – GCSE 12-21% 10-19% 
A levels 15-18% 18-23% 
Degree 10-28% 21-26% 
Level 1-2 NVQ/BTEC First Nil Nil 
Level 3-5 NVQ 6-9% 1-5% 
C&G Craft 4-7% Nil 
C&G Advanced 7-10% Nil 
OND/OND/BTEC National 7-12% 8% 
HNC/HND 6-22% 3-12% 
      
 
Source: Dearden et al. 2002. 
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Table 2  Annualised Earnings Premiums to Different UK Qualifications 
 
Men   
NQF level: Typical qualification Annualised return 
Academic level 3 2+ A levels 7.1% 
Academic level 4 First Degree 7.1% 
Academic level 5 Higher Degree 6.4% 
Academic level 3 ONC/OND 4.6% 
Academic level 4 HNC/HND 8.5% 
Academic level 5 Other degree/CA 7.4% 
   
Women   
NQF level: Typical qualification Annualised return 
Academic level 3 2+ A levels 6.7% 
Academic level 4 First Degree 7.2% 
Academic level 5 Higher Degree 6.7% 
Academic level 3 ONC/OND 2.6% 
Academic level 4 HNC/HND 7.7% 
Academic level 5 Other degree/CA 9.5% 
 
Source: Dickerson, 2005. Data from LFS 2000-2004. 
 
 
are significantly higher than the returns to vocational qualifications. For example, the return 
to O levels/ GCCSE is between 10 and 20%, as compared to nil return to NVQ level 1-2. 
Thirdly, individuals with the ‘newer’ vocational qualifications do particularly poorly in the 
labour market. Thus even NVQ3-5 yields relatively low returns, particularly for women, as 
compared to A levels or degrees. Some caution is required here however. Many vocational 
qualifications take less time to acquire and therefore an annualised return is needed, i.e. the 
return to an additional year of study for a given qualification. Dearden et al. 2002 found that 
when the time taken to acquire qualifications was taken into account, the value of vocational 
qualifications moved much closer to the value of academic qualifications. Dickerson 2005 
confirms this and his results are summarised in Table 2: 
 
Nonetheless, the evidence is clear that there are extremely low or even nil returns to lower 
level and newer vocational qualifications. We consider why this might be next. 
  
Returns to National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) 
A number of studies have found negative returns to NVQ level 1 and 2, for both men and 
women (Dearden et al, 2004b; Dickerson, 2005, McIntosh, 2004a), along with low returns to 
NVQ level 3. Negative returns imply that individuals with these qualifications earn less than 
individuals who have no qualifications at all. How can undertaking a qualification actually 
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lead to lower earnings? Part of the explanation is that individuals who take NVQ2 
qualifications tend to be of lower ability than individuals who do not take any qualifications 
at all, although the difference is small (Dearden et al. 2004b). This is not the whole story 
however, since the same work suggests that even for high ability workers, NVQ 2 
qualifications do not give a positive wage premium. This raises the question as to whether 
there is a signalling problem here. Workers, regardless of their actual ability, may be 
considered by employers to be less able or motivated if they take lower level NVQ 
qualifications. Certainly the returns to NVQ2 depend on where the qualification was 
obtained. The return is highest if the qualification was obtained via an employer and lowest 
(negative) if the qualification was obtained through government training (Dearden et al. 
2004b). Since most of the individuals taking NVQ2 via government training were previously 
unemployed, this too hints at a signalling problem. If employers perceive that less motivated/ 
less able and unemployed workers tend to take NVQ2 qualifications, they will offer lower 
salaries to workers with this qualification, since on average their expectation is that these 
workers will not be very productive. The negative signal that comes from having a NVQ2 
will then cause even higher ability workers with NVQ2 qualifications to be paid less (at least 
initially). This is just one potential explanation for the poor performance of these newer 
vocational qualifications however. 
 
What is also noticeable is that the return to other older Level 2 vocational qualifications (i.e. 
apprentices, City & Guilds and BTEC) is generally very positive. For example, males with 
City and Guilds qualifications at Level 2 earn 19% more than workers with no qualifications. 
Again there is some evidence that part of the explanation for this is that individuals who take 
these more traditional Level 2 qualifications are of higher ability. However, the difference in 
ability between workers with newer NVQs and those with older qualifications is relatively 
small. So perhaps the most likely explanation for the low value-added of the NVQ2, for 
example, is that individuals actually learn less through an NVQ2 course than through other 
level 2 vocational training. This is somewhat difficult to prove. However, we do know that 
the return to NVQs varies by sector (see Figures 4a and 4b), although they remain by and 
large negative or zero. For example, the return to NVQ 2 is positive and significant for men 
in Energy & Water Sector (12% in 1996-2001, and 3% in 2000-2004). The return to NVQ2 is 
positive and significant for women in Public Administration, Education and Health (3%) in 
1996-2001. Returns to higher level NVQs also tend to be greater in the private sector, than in 
the public sector. 
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This would suggest that where the content of these apparently similar qualifications differs, 
so does the economic value of the qualification. It is equally possible therefore, that the 
difference in returns between newer NVQs and the more traditional vocational qualifications 
is down to genuine differences in content and perceived value by employers. 
 
Figure 4A  Returns to NVQ2 by Sectors for Men 
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Figure 4B  Returns to NVQ2 by Sectors for Women 
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Source: Dearden et al (2004b); Dickenson (2005) 12. 
 
 
                                                 
12 See also Table 3 in the Appendix. 
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There is some good news about NVQs however. Although there is little hard evidence that 
taking a NVQ2 helps individuals to achieve higher qualifications later on, there is evidence 
that NVQs (even at Level 2) do help individuals to find and remain in employment. For 
example, workers with NVQ2 qualifications are 7 percentage points more likely to be 
employed if they are male, and 15 percentage points more likely if they are women who left 
school with no formal qualification (McIntosh, 2004a). At Level 3 the effect is even more 
impressive. Workers with NVQ3 qualifications have employment rates that are 10 percentage 
points higher for males and 17 percentage points higher for females. Furthermore, women are 
more likely to re-enter the labour market if they take an NVQ2 qualification (Jenkins, 2005). 
One must not underestimate the importance that these qualifications may have in assisting 
individuals into work or helping them stay the labour market. However, the low wage returns 
to NVQ2 remains of significant policy concern. 
 
Returns to apprenticeship 
We established that the economic value of lower level NVQs varies according to how the 
individual acquired the qualification. NVQs acquired via an employer had higher returns than 
those obtained via other routes. This suggests that where employers and employees identify a 
need for a particular NVQ qualification it yields a higher return. One would therefore expect 
that more structured training that results in NVQ certification would also yield higher returns. 
One route of particular interest to those addressing sector skill needs is the Modern 
Apprenticeship. Empirical evidence is somewhat mixed however. The return to an 
apprenticeship (with or without qualifications) is around 7% for men, but zero for women 
(McIntosh, 2004b). Interestingly, the return to an apprenticeship for men is doubled (from 7% 
to approximately 14%) if combined with an NVQ qualification at level 3 or above.  At NVQ2 
level, if the qualification is acquired as a result of an apprenticeship, the return is around 7%. 
So apprenticeships that do not lead to qualifications still have some economic value for 
males, particularly in manufacturing. However, apprenticeships combined with higher-level 
NVQ qualifications yield a much higher return. This implies that where vocational training 
leading to an NVQ is delivered jointly by employers and by learning providers, it has greater 
economic value in the labour market. The fact that apprenticeship is not working so well for 
women may be a sector rather than a gender bias issue. Women are concentrated in particular 
sectors of work and if apprenticeship is not so effective in these sectors this would explain the 
results. Further investigation of this is needed to be sure however. 
 
 16
Returns to higher education 
As is well known, there has been a particularly large expansion of higher education in the 
UK, resulting in many more individuals having both degrees and other types of level 4 
qualifications, such as HNCs and diplomas. Thus it might be in this area that we would 
expect to see falls in the return to education, even though in section 5 we concluded that there 
had been no aggregate fall in the rate of return to education. On average, compared to having 
level 3 qualifications or below, men with some higher education earn 18-21% more, whilst 
women earn 25-27% more (Dearden et al. (2004a)). However the more interesting question is 
what has happened to the return over time? Figures 5a and 5b show the return to a first degree 
for men and women by age at two points in time. The return to a first degree clearly varies 
across the life-course, peaking between the ages of 37 and 45 for males and the ages of 33 to 
41 years for women. Generally the figures suggest that there has not been much change in the 
return to a first degree across the two time periods (1996-1999 and 2000-2003). The 
exception being that the youngest age groups that appear to be earning a lower return to their 
first degree in 2000-2003, as compared to 1996-1999. Since it is the youngest age groups that 
will be most affected by the increase in the supply of graduates coming on to the labour 
market, this might be indicative evidence that the return to a first degree is falling.  
 
 
Figure 5A  Returns to First Degree by Time since Graduate for Men 
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Figure 5B  Returns to First Degree by Time since Graduate for Women 
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Source: Walker and Zhu, 2005.  
Note: Least squares estimation on Labour Force Survey data, controlling for first degree, doctorate, Master’s 
degree, other higher degree, postgraduate certificate in education, vocational qualification and a range of 
individual characteristics. 
 
 
Some caution is required however. It could be that individuals are taking longer to integrate 
into the labour market, and there is some evidence that they are more likely to spend some 
time in a non-graduate job than was previously the case. Around one third of new graduates 
are finding it more difficult to make the transition into the labour market, ending up in non-
graduate level jobs and earning less as a result (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Green et al. 
2002). This is particularly a problem for graduates with certain degree subjects, such as arts 
and humanities. It does not necessarily mean however, that these individuals will not 
eventually end up in graduate jobs earning a high return to their degree. In fact, the evidence 
in Table 3 suggests that for graduates who do secure a graduate level job, there has been 
hardly any decline in the returns to a degree. It appears that the value of a degree is falling 
somewhat only for those who fail to secure graduate level employment. 
 
Furthermore, it may not be the case that all young graduates face the same downturn in the 
return to their degree. As the number of graduates has increased, so has the heterogeneity of 
the graduate group. This is reflected in the larger variation in returns of a first degree. For 
example, Chevalier and Conlon (2003) find that male graduates from prestigious universities 
can expect to earn up to 6% more than those from Modern universities. Furthermore, as Table 
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4 illustrates, the returns to a degree vary hugely by subject of degree13. This in turn reflects 
the variation in the returns to a degree across different sectors and types of work.  
 
Table 3 Returns to Degrees by Job Types – in percentage (%) 
 
              Men          Women 
Non-graduate 
jobs 96-99 00-03 96-99 00-03 
     
Age 41-59 -4 0 11 11 
Age 37-45 7 12 10 7 
Age 33-41 14 8 14 22 
Age 29-37 12 3 24 12 
Age 25-33 11 6 11 18 
Age 25-29 12 0 13 11 
     
Graduate jobs 96-99 00-03 96-99 00-03 
     
Age 41-59 28 35 51 53 
Age 37-45 34 32 52 53 
Age 33-41 28 31 49 59 
Age 29-37 28 29 53 53 
Age 25-33 32 30 44 47 
Age 25-29 30 29 35 38 
          
 
Source: Walker and Zhu, 2005. 
 
 
Table 4 indicates that in certain subjects, such as economics, business and law, there has been 
little change in the return to a first degree across the two time periods, at least for males. 
Nonetheless, the overriding trend is downward for the youngest cohort. Furthermore, 
although the return to most subjects is still very high by international standards, in some 
subject areas and for some individuals it has collapsed to zero (arts and humanities for men). 
Thus although the demand for graduates still outstrips the supply and so there is still a 
significant payoff for possessing higher educational qualifications (Blundell, Dearden and 
Sianesi, 2005; McIntosh, 2005), this recent evidence does suggest a slight fall in the wage 
premium for very recent graduates in particular subjects (Purcell et al. 2005; Sloane and 
O’Leary, 2004; Walker and Zhu, 2005). In particular, very recent arts and humanities 
graduates have seen a fall in the immediate return to their degrees to zero.  
 
                                                 
13 See also Table 1 in the Appendix for the returns to narrower subject areas. 
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Table 4  Returns to Degrees by Subjects for Recent Graduates – in percentage (%) 
 
 
              
         Age 29-37         Age 25-33         Age 25-29 
       
Men 96-99 00-03 96-99 00-03 96-99 00-03 
       
Health & Science 19 14 20 11 19 12 
Math & Engineering 27 26 31 30 32 28 
Econ/Business/Law 35 28 35 33 24 22 
Education/SocStuds 19 8 12 0 20 6 
Arts & Humanities 2 0 -1 -3 6 -1 
Combined 20 25 25 19 18 13 
              
Women 96-99 00-03 96-99 00-03 96-99 00-03 
       
Health & Science 42 34 38 34 24 18 
Math & Engineering 45 45 49 42 33 35 
Econ/Business/Law 61 47 47 38 36 29 
Education/SocStuds 37 32 29 28 20 17 
Arts & Humanities 29 17 10 25 17 12 
Combined 40 35 29 33 23 20 
              
   
Source: Walker and Zhu, 2005. 
 
 
7.  Discussion and Policy Implications 
 
This paper sets out to describe how rate of return analyses could be used to determine how 
much education or training and what types of education or training individuals and the state 
should invest in. A complex picture emerges from the evidence base. 
 
Certainly, in the UK there has been a massive expansion in the supply of qualified labour, 
even if we still lag behind our international competitors in some regards. This expansion of 
supply has not lead to a fall in the average return to a year of schooling in the UK14, 
suggesting that the demand for qualifications in the UK is still sufficiently high to justify the 
expansion. A national policy to continue to expand the supply of more educated (and by 
implication more skilled) labour is therefore in line with aggregate labour market evidence. 
Further state investment to expand the supply of qualified labour would appear to be a 
sensible strategy overall. However, we have highlighted some particular issues of concern.  
 
                                                 
14 See Table 4 in the Appendix for robust estimates of the return to a year of schooling, using instrumental 
variables. 
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Firstly, whilst the return to academic and older vocational qualifications has remained high, 
newer vocational qualifications (particularly NVQ2) yield a zero or minimal return in the 
labour market.  Research suggests that lower level NVQs can assist those individuals who are 
out of the labour market back into work, so they do have some economic value. However, the 
evidence seems to suggest that the content and hence the real value of these qualifications to 
employers, varies substantially across sectors. More research is needed on the ground to 
understand why NVQs have been successful in some sectors and less so in others. We know 
that qualifications do not equate to skill and perhaps NVQs in some sectors are not providing 
individuals with the skills that employers need. We also need to inform individuals about the 
variable and low returns to these newer vocational qualifications so that they can make 
optimal decisions about what type of education and training to invest in. For example, many 
of these NVQ qualifications yield a respectably high return if they are acquired through a 
modern apprenticeship. This is the type of vital information that a young person needs when 
making his or her career decisions. 
 
At the other end of the scale, rapid expansion of the supply of graduates has resulted in much 
more variation in graduate outcomes. Although the overall return to a degree has not 
declined, suggesting sufficient demand for the kinds of skill developed in higher education, it 
does appear that some types of more recent graduates are seeing a small decline in the return 
to their degree. Much of the apparent fall in the return to a degree for very new graduates is 
concentrated specifically on graduates who fail to get graduate level jobs. Around one third 
of new graduates are ending up in non-graduate level jobs and earning less as a result. 
Furthermore, the likelihood of not being able to get a graduate job is higher for graduates 
with particular degree subjects, namely those subjects that also have very low returns, such as 
arts and humanities. Certainly there is increasing diversity of the graduate group, with larger 
variation in returns across different degree subjects, and by implication across different 
sectors of the economy. The strength of the demand for different degree subjects obviously 
varies and for some subjects, it appears we already have sufficient supply. In particular, the 
return to arts and humanities degrees for very recent graduates appears to have fallen to zero. 
This evidence has important implications for the higher education sector, given that the 
introduction of higher and variable tuition fees is likely to focus students’ minds on the return 
to their choice of degree subject. By shifting some of the costs of HE on to students, it is 
likely that more students will seek to choose subjects that better reflect the demands of the 
labour market. One would expect therefore a decline in the numbers taking certain subjects 
that are already showing signs of oversupply. 
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 What all this means in policy terms is that we need to be doing more to understand how well 
different qualifications meet the needs of employers, particularly in terms of their curriculum 
content. It is an interesting fact that qualifications that are supposedly tailored to employers’ 
skill needs, such as NVQs, are actually valued less highly in the labour market. Employers 
may demand certain specific skills that are indeed encapsulated in NVQs but on the ground, it 
is the traditional vocational qualifications and academic qualifications that have the greater 
economic value. In this context, there is still much to be done in terms of rethinking our 
vocational strategy and ensuring that our vocational qualifications really do develop the range 
of skills that employers need. Of course, the evidence presented here is very much looking 
backwards, showing the current labour market value of qualifications that were introduced 
some time ago. It cannot tell us about the likely economic value of the newer vocational 
qualifications, such as vocational GCSEs. What we can conclude however is that a policy of 
expanding the aggregate supply of skills is not sufficient. What is needed is an expansion of 
the supply of the right kind of skills. For this to happen, employers, individuals and policy-
makers need robust up to date information on the real labour market value of different 
qualifications, in order to help them navigate through the increasingly complex education 
system and make the optimal kinds of investment decisions. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Table 1A Percentage Returns to Narrow First Degree Subjects for Men (1994-2004) 
 
 
Men Mark-up 
  
Accountancy 42.15 
Electrical engineering 40.73 
Maths and computing 37.23 
Mechanical engineering 33.71 
Medicine and related 32.06 
Engineering and technology 31.85 
Civil engineering 29.25 
Economics 28.57 
Law 28.04 
Education 26.47 
Business and financial 
studies 26.53 
Sciences 25.22 
Geography 23.42 
Combined 22.41 
Architecture and related 20.97 
Languages 19.22 
Psychology 18.66 
Biology 15.87 
Politics 15.70 
Nursing 14.39 
Social sciences 14.20 
History 11.69 
English 10.84 
Sociology 10.83 
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Table 1B Percentage Returns to Narrow First Degree Subjects for Women (1994-2004) 
 
 
Women Mark-up 
  
Accountancy 37.12 
Medicine and related 27.52 
Law 23.97 
Education 22.40 
Electrical engineering 19.04 
Architecture and related 18.70 
Maths and computing 18.10 
Business and financial 
studies 14.34 
Nursing 13.93 
Mechanical engineering 13.84 
Civil engineering 13.70 
Engineering and technology 13.54 
Social sciences 13.45 
Economics 9.68 
English 6.65 
Sociology 6.50 
Sciences 6.13 
Combined 5.58 
Geography 4.34 
Languages 3.30 
Psychology 1.98 
Biology 1.60 
History 0.95 
Politics -0.91 
    
 
Note: All returns are measured relative to an Arts degree. 
 
Source: Sloane and O’Leary (2004) 
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Table 2 International Comparisons of the Returns to Schooling 
(1985-1995) – in percentage (%) 
 
 
  Men Women 
   
USA 7.4 9.6 
Great Britain 12.7 13 
West Germany 3.6 4.3 
Russia 4.4 5.3 
Norway 2.3 2.5 
Australia 5.1 5.2 
Netherlands 3.1 1.9 
Austria 3.8 6.4 
Poland  7.3 10 
East Germany 2.6 4.5 
New Zealand 3.3 2.9 
Italy 3.7 5.3 
Ireland 8.5 9 
Japan 7.5 9.4 
Hungary 7.5 7.7 
N. Ireland 17.4 14.6 
Sweden 2.4 3.3 
Slovenia 8 10.1 
Israel 5.3 6.1 
Czech Rep. 3.5 4.3 
Bulgaria 4 5.7 
Solvak Rep. 5.2 6.4 
Canada 3.8 4.5 
Czechoslovakia 3.1 3.6 
Spain 4.6 3.8 
Switzerland 4.5 4.8 
Latvia 6.7 7.8 
Philippines 11.3 19.2 
Pooled 4.8 5.7 
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Table 3 The Returns to NVQ2 by Sectors for Men (%) 
 
 
  
1996-
2001 
2000-
2004 
Agriculture & Fishing -6.4 -3.9 
Energy & Water 12.3 3.3 
Manufacturing -1.9 -5 
Construction -4 1.3 
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants -4.6 -0.7 
Transport & Communication -3.8 0.4 
Banking, Finance & Insurance -14.3 -13.6 
Public Administration, Education & 
Health -8.3 -10.2 
Other Services -7.2 -6.5 
 
 
Table 3B: The Returns to NVQ2 by Sectors for Women (%) 
 
 
  
1996-
2001 
2000-
2004 
Agriculture & Fishing 4.3 -13.8 
Energy & Water -11.8 -19.4 
Manufacturing -0.4 -5.2 
Construction -2.9 -15 
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants 1.3 -5.7 
Transport & Communication -6.7 -12 
Banking, Finance & Insurance -6.6 -13.6 
Public Administration, Education & 
Health 3.1 -12 
Other Services 6.6 -10 
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Table 4 Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimates of the Return to Schooling for the UK 
 
 
  OLS IV Instruments 
NCDS Men 4.8% 5.5% Family composition, parental education 
Dearden (1998)       
FES 78-86 Men 6.1% 15.2% Changes in school leaving age 
Harmon and Walker (1995)       
GHS 92 Men 4.9% 14.0% Changes in school leaving age and 
Harmon and Walker (1999)   educational reforms 
NCDS Men 5.0% 9.9% Family background 
Harmon and Walker (2000)       
Twins research (Women) 7.7% 10.4% Smoking at 16 on identical twins data 
Bonjour et al (2003)       
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